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Facebook Fallacies
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. ∗
The papers prepared by the scholars contributing to this
symposium are generally sympathetic to the concept that the
material on a person’s Facebook somehow should be protected
against unwanted disclosure on the part of the person whose face
has been booked, so to speak. I use the term “Facebook” to
refer generically to electronic biographies of one kind or
another, not simply Facebook, the copyrighted original.
The papers are also very sober and well-considered. They
conclude that under existing law there seems little hope that
such protection can be established under constitutional law,
whether in the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Those conclusions
seem to be correct.
It is not that some such concept of privacy cannot be
envisioned. The contributors in various ways envision that
concept.
Some such concept could find its way into
constitutional law. Indeed, the concept in fact found its way into
constitutional law and remained there for a very substantial
period.
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I. BOYD V. UNITED STATES, 1886
The original occasion for such an event appears to have
been Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). That case
involved a forfeiture prosecution for fraud in the importation of
goods in violation of the obligation to pay tariffs. In presenting
its case, the Government sought and obtained an order directing
defendants, who were partners in the importing business, to
produce certain documents involved in the transaction. The
Government then offered the documents in evidence, obtained a
conviction, and defended the lower-court ruling before the
Supreme Court. The Court held that the compelled production
was a violation of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
saying:
[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers
of the owner of the goods . . . is compelling himself to be a
witness against himself . . . .”

116 U.S. at 635.
II. FISHER V. UNITED STATES, 1976
The decision in Boyd, and subsequent decisions to the same
effect, was extensively reviewed by the Supreme Court in Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Court in Fisher
acknowledged that the Boyd rule had still been applied in 1921
in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and indeed as
late as 1957, in Curcio v. United States¸ 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
But, as the Court noted, tension and contradiction had arisen as
early at 1910. In that year, in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245 (1910), it was held that no constitutional violation was
involved in requiring a criminal defendant to don a garment
worn by the perpetrator of the offense being prosecuted. A
cascade of cases in the 1960s had refused to find violations of
the Fifth Amendment in incriminating acts such as a suspect
being compelled to give a blood sample, or being compelled to
demonstrate his handwriting.
These changes in doctrine reveal what most candid
observers have long observed: That the judicial system in
general and the decisions of the Supreme Court in particular,
historically do not maintain a strictly straight line in adhering to
precedent. The question then arises whether the Supreme Court
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might someday and somehow be persuaded that records such as
Facebook entries should not be admissible evidence against the
person who is their subject.
III. A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Fisher was written by Justice White. It is to be remembered
that, before going on the bench, Justice White had a high
position in the Department of Justice. From the perspective of
the Justice Department, there were important categories of cases
in which access to “private papers” and the like was of great
practical importance. At the time, in the 1960’s, these included
the investigation and prosecution of offenses such as tax
evasion, securities fraud, organized crime control of gambling,
and distribution of illegal drugs. These offenses typically
involved networks of participants whose members
communicated with each other. Having access to these
communications, for example by wire-tapping, was essential as
a practical matter to successful prosecution.
Justice White in his opinion in Fisher did not mention this
background, but he surely was mindful of it. We can assume
that other members of the Court had a similar understanding.
If we shift focus to the present day, we must become
mindful that an additional criminal threat is upon us, that of
terrorist activities. I do not wish to exaggerate the threat of
terrorism. However, the risks are real and evident in the Twin
Towers attack of September 11 and lesser attacks and threats to
our home territory, such as the attempted car bombing in
Manhattan a couple of years ago. There are also serious events
outside our borders, including the attack on the American
embassy in Africa and the attacks to which our military and
other personnel are exposed in other parts of the world.
Moreover, as one of the democracies, we must cooperate with
those in Western Europe, Israel, Japan and other similarly
inclined regimes to maintain the intelligence networks through
which we try to keep these threats under reasonable control.
The terrorist threat unquestionably requires aggressive
intelligence gathering directed toward people who are trying to
keep their activities secret. We have learned that innocent
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people can be made accomplices in financial, political and moral
support of enemies of our country.
IV. PRIVACY PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD
The resulting situation is that the investigative bureaus of
the government must be allowed to gather information that
could lead to bad-actors, as long as the means do not violate
constitutional protections. The legal question, then, is how the
constitutional protections will be interpreted. A person should
not be subject to compulsory interrogation that would lead to
self-incriminating answers. That is the protection of the Fifth
Amendment. A person should not be subject to search and
seizure of things as to which he or she has a “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” as the phrase goes, except on the basis
of a proper search warrant. That is the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court in recent years has stated and
signaled that it will interpret these standards with realistic
awareness of the problems in detecting and prosecuting not only
offenses such as distribution of illegal drugs, but also the new
threats from terrorism.
V. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
When the problem of a Facebook entry is approached in
these terms, it seems clear that the contents of such an entry are
not immune from examination and use in evidence by
prosecuting authorities. On a somewhat different path of
reasoning, it seems clear that they would not be immune from
discovery in civil litigation. The law has faced a somewhat
similar problem regarding email. Many people have thought
that emails should somehow be immune from exposure in
discovery in civil cases and exposure in criminal cases. It is
now clear that email is subject to exposure. Indeed, a colleague
has suggested that the “e” in email stands for “Exhibit.”
Lawyers have had a better understanding of the situation.
They know that committing a thought to writing makes it
difficult and often impossible to later qualify what has been said
in writing, let alone contradict it. They know that this difficulty
will be confronted even for emails that were written hastily or
by someone who did not know what he was talking about. They
know that discussion of critically important issues should, if
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possible, be conducted orally and only then memorialized in a
considered formulation.
Lawyers have learned to conduct their own affairs in this
fashion; for example, during internal law firm review of possible
mishandling of a client matter. They have sought to educate
their clients toward a similar approach in the clients’ internal
deliberations. The role of inside legal counsel is strategically
important in this regard.
Similar awareness should be addressed to Facebook entries.
Lawyers should be cautious about what they say of themselves,
or let other people say of them. They should counsel clients to
be similarly aware. It is not that keeping written forms under
control allows for fabricating testimony after the event. That
certainly can happen. But awareness of the kind I have
suggested recognizes that electronic writing often suffers from
the imprecision involved in oral spontaneity, but yields a record
having the formality of a written contract or deed. In a world
where all evidence is imperfect that is a risk that an ethical
lawyer must attend to.

